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The State Department Speaks



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A series of four broadcasts presented over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company on January 8, 15, 22, and 29, 1944 to acquaint the American people with what the Department of State is doing to meet international problems

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The State Department Speaks

➤➤ *January 8, 1944* ◀◀

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LEO PASVOLSKY	Special Assistant to the Secretary, in charge of post-war planning
MICHAEL J. McDERMOTT	Chief of the Division of Current Information
RICHARD HARKNESS	Representing the public

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: For the American people, the National Broadcasting Company launches tonight a limited series of programs called "The State Department Speaks". To introduce the series—to tell you the ideas behind it—we present the Honorable Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State. Mr. Stettinius.

STETTINIUS: A few weeks ago the National Broadcasting Company invited the Department of State to participate in four broadcasts to tell the American people more about our work in the Government, and something about the problems involved in carrying out an American foreign policy. We in the Department of State were very glad to accept this proposal because we want to use every opportunity to keep the public informed about what the Government of the United States is doing to meet our inter-

national problems. It is your Government and it is you who in the long run determine what our foreign policy shall be. As most of you know, the Department of State is the only department of your Government which deals directly with governments of foreign countries. At its head is the President's senior Cabinet officer, Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

During this evening's program and the other programs in this series, Mr. Richard Harkness, NBC commentator, will undertake to represent you, the public, in putting questions to the State Department officials who appear on the program. Mr. Harkness has warned us that he is not going to be satisfied with any "handouts". He says he is going to ask questions which he thinks you people would ask, if you had the chance. We have told Mr. Harkness that we would try to answer them as fully as we can.

We shall make available to him as many of the responsible officials of the Department as he wants to talk to, and his list for the four programs already includes Secretary Hull, all the Assistant Secretaries of State, several division chiefs, special advisers, at least one Ambassador, and myself as Under Secretary. Because the Department of State works closely with the Congress in the formulation of foreign policy, you will also hear from some of our congressional leaders during the course of these broadcasts. The National Broadcasting Company is to be congratulated for this effort to bring closer together the State Department as a whole and the millions of people it represents in their dealings with foreign nations. Now Richard Harkness will carry on with the first program of "The State Department Speaks".

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Stettinius, and good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Richard Harkness. I'm speaking to you from a large four-storied building on Pennsylvania Avenue, in Washington, next door to the White House. If you're ever looking out of a window

in this building, and you see a man on the street shudder when he looks toward it, you can bet your life that man is an architect. For this building—the Old Lady of Pennsylvania Avenue they call it—is no aesthetic treat. Its pillars and columns and cupolas, its whole gingerbread granite construction, goes back to a time that is dead and gone. Amen. But don't get me wrong! The Old Lady of Pennsylvania Avenue has no hang-dog appearance! For this grand old building is the home of our Department of State—the official address of the man who would succeed to the Presidency in case of the death or incapacity of the President and Vice President. Its rooms are shrines to many stirring events that dot the pages of our national history—tragic reminders of others.

I'm sitting here in the office of the Secretary of State. Across the way is the waiting-room where Messrs. Nomura and Kurusu sat on that fateful Sunday in 1941. Up on the walls of this room are the portraits of some of our most distinguished Secretaries of State—men who have moulded and guided our foreign policy down through the years. There's Stimson, Secretary of State when the Japanese first started their conquest in Manchuria in 1931—now our Secretary of War.

There's Kellogg, the author of the Kellogg pact, who tried so hard to outlaw war forever. There's Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State Lansing, and the venerable, bearded Charles Evans Hughes, who served under Harding and Coolidge. Yes, there are memories in this room, many of them, and a spirit of dignity and integrity seems to be part of it—a spirit that is the proud heritage of our Department of State. Yes, this is the room where Secretary Hull meets the press every day, but I'm the only newsman here tonight. I'm here as *your* representative. I'm here to find out what goes on within these walls—to try to peek behind the veil of mystery and secrecy which popular tradition says sur-

rounds the activities of the State Department. But I can be successful as your representative only if you help me. Write me the questions you want answered about our State Department. I can't promise to use them all, nor to acknowledge them, but I'll use some of them, and, in any case, your questions will help guide me in laying out my interviews with the individuals Mr. Stettinius mentioned a few moments ago.

And now let's get on with the first set of them. I found through experience that one of the best men to go to for information down here is Michael J. McDermott, known affectionately throughout the State Department and to every newspaperman in Washington as "Mac". He is the Chief of the Division of Current Information. He's the guy who keeps us newsmen posted on what's going on in foreign affairs and he's always ready for us, day and night. Mac is right here with me now, as are two other gentlemen you will be glad to meet. But before I talk to them, Mac, tell me, does your division have any share in formulating the foreign policy of the United States?

McDERMOTT: Let me answer you this way, Dick. Every man and woman in the United States who is so inclined can have a share in formulating our foreign policy, but in order to do this, they need accurate information to guide them in forming their opinions. We help to make information on foreign affairs available to them through press and radio fellows like yourself, and so we help them judge and analyze for themselves what is going on in the world. And, as I said before, they in turn—I am talking now about the man in the street—decide in the last analysis what our national foreign policy shall be.

HARKNESS: I see. In other words, you're saying that the work of our free press and radio has a lot to do with the actual formulation of our foreign policy by giving the people the facts on which they form their opinions.

MCDERMOTT: Right, but I know what's on your mind primarily tonight, Dick. You're interested in getting some straight dope on the Moscow Conference and what goes on in our post-war planning work.

HARKNESS: You bet I am.

MCDERMOTT: Well, here are two gentlemen, two experts, who will be able to help you out. Each of them has made a life study of international affairs. Mr. James C. Dunn has specialized particularly in international political relations, and Mr. Leo Pasvolsky is known as an outstanding expert on international economic affairs. And so all I can say to you, Dick, is go ahead and ask them anything you want. I am sure they'll do their best to answer you.

HARKNESS: O. K. Mac, I think I'll start with Mr. Pasvolsky, who, I understand, is a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in charge of post-war planning. Is that right, Sir?

PASVOLSKY: Yes, that's right.

HARKNESS: Well, do you mind telling me something about what you post-war planners do, and how you got started and what not?

PASVOLSKY: Certainly, Mr. Harkness. When war came in Europe we faced one of the most difficult jobs of international relations in our history. It entailed not only the conduct of foreign affairs in a world at war, but also preparation for meeting the problems which this country was bound to face after the fighting was over.

HARKNESS: Are you saying, Mr. Pasvolsky, that our State Department's preparations for meeting post-war problems began upon the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939?

PASVOLSKY: That's right. And, we were actually at work early in 1940.

HARKNESS: How did you begin?

PASVOLSKY: We started off with a group of committees to study the future implications for this country of what was happening elsewhere

in the world. In February 1941, the Department created a special research unit for this purpose. Of course, both the committee and research work became real post-war planning after December 7, 1941.

HARKNESS: Well, that's getting an early start; tell me—what are the main subjects your planning unit is working on today?

PASVOLSKY: First of all, there is a group of subjects relating to arrangements necessary for the conclusion of the war. These comprise the terms to be imposed on the enemy nations after their surrender, including control of the enemy countries after they have been occupied by the United Nations forces, and the eventual definitive peace terms.

HARKNESS: I see.

PASVOLSKY: Another group of subjects relates to liberated areas. Briefly, this entails exploring the problems of reestablishment of independence in those countries which have been deprived of their freedom by the Axis invaders. Many of those countries, don't forget, will be starving and disorganized. They will need relief and other help in reestablishing their economic life.

HARKNESS: Of course. Go on, Mr. Pasvol-sky.

PASVOLSKY: A third group of subjects relates to the all-important problem of providing for the future maintenance of peace and security.

HARKNESS: Now you are reaching right into the hearts of almost two billion people—two billion people who have learned now what total war is and who never want to see another one. What *are* our State Department's plans on how to preserve the peace, Mr. Pasvol-sky?

PASVOLSKY: Well, we start with the basic assumption that the elimination of war and the establishment of security for all nations require cooperative effort on the part of the peace-loving nations, based on order under law.

HARKNESS: Yes, but how are you going to get

nations to cooperate? No one has ever yet succeeded in doing that for long.

PASVOLSKY: We know that, Mr. Harkness, only too well. But we are not and we must not be discouraged. We believe that cooperation between peace- and freedom-loving nations *can* be achieved in time of peace as it has been achieved in time of war. To do this these nations must create certain facilities and instrumentalities for international action.

HARKNESS: Such as——?

PASVOLSKY: Well, there must obviously be arrangements for settling international disputes by pacific means, rather than by recourse to war. But above all, there must be arrangements for suppressing aggression.

HARKNESS: Now wait a moment, Mr. Pasvolsky. Seems to me that was tried once before, with the League of Nations.

PASVOLSKY: Yes, it was—up to a point. But this time, as Secretary Hull has long maintained, there must be the *clear* certainty for all concerned that breaches of the peace will not be tolerated, that they will be suppressed—by force, if necessary.

HARKNESS: Good! You suggested a question to me which I will ask you later, Mr. Pasvolsky, but please continue. Sorry to interrupt.

PASVOLSKY: Think nothing of it, Mr. Harkness, we're used to interruptions. The fourth group of subjects in our post-war work covers the problem of developing relations among nations which will help improve their economic and social conditions. This field includes so many ramifications dealing with trade barriers, tariffs, cartels, aviation, shipping, labor standards, migration, education, and so forth, that I could keep you here for hours talking about them. We are trying hard not to miss one practical idea or plan through which international cooperation can help make this a better world to live in. I might add, Mr. Harkness, that we

are not so foolish as to think we can solve these problems in the State Department alone or even in the Government as a whole. It's a tough job which will take the best thought and effort of all of us.

HARKNESS: I sure agree with you on that. But tell me, what happens to all these plans of your group? As soon as they're formulated they immediately become part of our foreign policy—is that it?

PASVOLSKY: Oh, indeed no! Not that easy! It's more like the camel going through the eye of the needle. Here's what happens, Mr. Harkness. Each question is thoroughly explored by the Department's expert staff, in cooperation with experts of other departments and agencies. All available information is analyzed and woven into memoranda which set forth the pertinent facts about the particular problem and the alternative methods open to us for solving the problem. The memoranda are examined and discussed by committees or less formal groups, and the resulting conclusions are embodied in recommendations as to the most desirable of the alternative solutions. These recommendations go to the Secretary of State and, through him, to the President. But even then, before taking final decisions, the Secretary and the President discuss the matter with high officials of the Government and also with members of Congress and with competent persons outside the Government. These decisions become our basic line of policy to be pursued in negotiations with other governments.

HARKNESS: Safe and sane is the word for it, Mr. Pasvolsky. Seriously though, it's good to know, as just an ordinary everyday American, that so much careful thought and consideration are being given to the planning of our foreign policy.

PASVOLSKY: Of course, you mustn't forget one important thing, Mr. Harkness. All the careful plans in the world are of no use until they are

agreed to by the other nations involved, and such agreement can come only after discussions and negotiations with those nations.

HARKNESS: I can see that. Wouldn't you say that one of the best examples of translating post-war planning into action was the famous Moscow Conference?

PASVOLSKY: Without a doubt, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: Fine! Let's see then what happened to those plans of yours at Moscow. Mr. McDermott, *you* went to Moscow, didn't you?

McDERMOTT: Yes, I did, but here's the man who really can tell you what happened there: Mr. James C. Dunn, Adviser to the Secretary of State on Political Relations for the European Area.

HARKNESS: O. K., Mr. Dunn. Let's get right down to business. You went to Moscow yourself, and I suppose you were in on all the arrangements that had to be made before the Conference could be held.

DUNN: Yes, I was.

HARKNESS: I imagine making the preparations for such a momentous meeting as the Moscow Conference is not exactly child's play, Mr. Dunn.

DUNN: You're certainly right about that, Mr. Harkness. The Moscow Conference didn't just up and happen over night. A lot of mighty hard work went into the preparations for that meeting of Mr. Hull, Mr. Molotov, and Mr. Eden. As Mr. Pasvolsky just explained, we had behind us almost three years of general preparations on post-war problems. That was the bedrock on the basis of which we were able to compress our final preparations into four or five weeks.

HARKNESS: That's very interesting and significant—you had four or five weeks' actual preparation for the Conference. Let's see now, your meeting in Moscow began on October 19—that means the actual decision to hold the Conference must have been made sometime in early

September 1943. Am I about right, Mr. Dunn?

DUNN: Yes—you're 100 percent correct on that one, Mr. Harkness. The decision to hold the Moscow meeting was made by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill very shortly after the Quebec Conference.

HARKNESS: That's an interesting piece of news. What were the reasons for the Moscow Conference? What did you expect to accomplish? What did Russia want—and what did we want?

DUNN: Well, bringing it down to almost ridiculous simplicity, the Russians were primarily interested in matters of military aid and cooperation to crush Nazi Germany as quickly as possible. We, of course, were equally concerned with this question. But, in addition to that, we were vitally interested in finding out Russia's attitude on cooperation in building a durable peace after the victory had been won. Secretary Hull knew that that question had to be faced and that the sooner it *was* faced the better for all of us—Russia, Britain, China, and the United States. And that's why there was a Moscow Conference and why the Secretary traveled 25 thousand miles by air and sea to make our contribution to its success.

HARKNESS: Well, what happened at the Conference, Mr. Dunn?

DUNN: Secretary Hull, as soon as he arrived, pointed out to Marshal Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov that the nations represented at the Conference and their leaders faced a greater responsibility for the future life, liberty, and happiness for their own and all other peoples than any nations or statesmen had ever faced before.

HARKNESS: That's no kidding!

DUNN: He made it quite clear that he would speak frankly in the national interests of the United States, but he also said that he was convinced that there was sufficient common ground

between the national interests of the three countries to lay the basis for a better world.

HARKNESS: How did the Russians take that?

DUNN: I think they liked it.

HARKNESS: What would you say was the *greatest* achievement of the Moscow Conference?

DUNN: I'd say it was the Four-Nations Declaration, including, as the President and Secretary Hull so strongly desired, the great Republic of China.

HARKNESS: What are some of the big points in the Four-Nations Declaration?

DUNN: Well, here are several of the main points: In the first place, the four nations reaffirm their determination to continue the fight until their respective enemies have laid down their arms in unconditional surrender; secondly, the four nations will continue their present united cooperation into the future to organize and maintain peace; and finally, a general international organization should be established as soon as possible, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership of all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

HARKNESS: Then, as I understand that important last point, this does not mean that the "Big Four" nations expect to run the world alone, according to their own desires.

DUNN: Absolutely not, Mr. Harkness! And that's a very important point. The President and Secretary Hull had long held the conviction that the only sure method of maintaining the security of the United States in the future and avoiding other terrible wars was the establishment of a general system of international cooperation in which all nations, large and small, would play their part. This basic principle became the core of the preliminary draft of the Four-Nations Declaration which the Secretary of State took with him to the Moscow Conference.

HARKNESS: What was that you said, Mr. Dunn? Did I understand you to say that Secretary Hull took the draft of the Four-Nations Declaration with him to Moscow?

DUNN: Yes, that's correct—he did.

HARKNESS: Hmm! Mac, that's something you didn't tell us. Well, anyway, Mr. Dunn, you really mean without any reservations that the Moscow Conference was a success.

DUNN: Yes, Mr. Harkness. The Moscow Conference marked a dramatic and monumental milestone in the development of our foreign policy, not because it settled all the difficult issues but, rather, because it settled the most important single question, which up to that time no man could answer with certainty.

HARKNESS: What was that?

DUNN: That question was whether the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and ourselves were determined to seek their, and the world's, salvation through international cooperation, or whether they had other plans and designs for the future.

HARKNESS: And the answer to that question was what we wanted?

DUNN: Yes, it was, I am happy to say. These four nations committed themselves to a policy of *continuing* cooperation. If they hadn't done so, the international future would indeed be a hopeless one. The dread certainty of a third world war would have settled on us even before World War II was finished. I believe that this is the true meaning of Moscow—by their pledge of a continued cooperation both among themselves and with the other peace-loving nations of the world, these nations have given assurance that the world has at least the possibility of a peaceful future.

HARKNESS: Thanks a lot for those interesting slants on the Moscow Conference, Mr. Dunn.

I've got several other questions I want to ask you, but right now I'd like to put one to Mr. Pasvolsky before it slips my mind or he gets away from me. Mr. Pasvolsky, a little

while ago you mentioned that the State Department believes that in the future, breaches of the peace must be suppressed by force, if necessary. Now does that mean an international police force?

PASVOLSKY: You know, a lot of people are talking about an international police force, but nobody has as yet figured out just what it means. So I can't give you a yes or no answer. But I would like to say this: There are many ways in which police *power* can be exercised to suppress aggression. We are exploring several possibilities, but we cannot tell at this stage what precise arrangements the nations will be able to agree on. That will depend on a lot of things here and abroad. But one thing is certain: there will be no commitment involving this country without the clear approval of the American people.

HARKNESS: In other words, that is one of the answers which is yet to be worked out and agreed upon, is that right?

PASVOLSKY: It certainly is.

McDERMOTT: Dick, might I add a word there?

HARKNESS: Surely, Mac, go ahead.

McDERMOTT: That discussion between you and Mr. Pasvolsky illustrates pretty well one of the toughest problems we have in the State Department. In a sense you didn't get an answer to your last question, and yet Mr. Pasvolsky did explain why he couldn't answer more fully.

HARKNESS: Yes, and quite satisfactorily for me.

McDERMOTT: The point is that we're up against that sort of thing day and night in the State Department, and quite often there are equally good reasons why a particular question cannot be answered.

HARKNESS: Well, why, for instance?

McDERMOTT: Well, it might be for reasons of military security, or possible use and distortion by enemy propaganda, or possible embarrass-

ment to one of our Allies or a country whose friendship or at least neutrality is important to us. Whatever the reason, Dick, you can be sure that we don't hold back simply for the sake of being mysterious.

HARKNESS: I know that, Mac, and I think most of us would feel the same way you do about those "no comment" cases if the tables were switched and we were in the Department's place.

Mr. Dunn, let me ask you this: Some people have been saying that we are indifferent as to whether Fascism stays in Italy so long as Mussolini is out. Is there anything to that?

DUNN: There most certainly is not. We intend to see that Fascism in Italy is pulled up by the roots. This point was covered definitely by one of the important declarations issued at the Moscow Conference.

HARKNESS: That's right, it was. And I'm glad you reminded us of it, because I happen to think that declaration on Italy merits a mighty important and solid place in our foreign policy.

Mac, getting back to something you said earlier and which a lot of people are always saying around the State Department. You say it's the 130 million American citizens who in the final analysis decide our foreign policy. Now that sounds swell, Mac, and makes us all seem very important, but what is the average citizen supposed to do—pick up the phone and call Secretary Hull in Washington and tell him what he wants? How about it, Mac? How can the average person help guide American foreign policy?

McDERMOTT: Very simply, Dick. We have a free press and a free radio in this country, and we have representative government, and a mailing system that is very, very inexpensive. Anybody who wants to play a part in forming our foreign policy has merely to sit down and write a letter to his favorite editor, or write to his Congressman, or his Senator, or to the President, or to the State Department and say what he thinks. Also, don't forget, almost every in-

dividual belongs to some group, whether it's a labor, business, agricultural, church, or educational group, and through these or similar groups, he can make himself heard in an effective way.

HARKNESS: In other words, it's democracy at work again. Right, Mac?

McDERMOTT: Right.

HARKNESS: Well, time flies, gentlemen, even in Washington. Our first half hour here at the State Department is almost up.

I think it's been profitable and I want to thank all of you, Messrs. Stettinius, Dunn, Pasvolsky, and McDermott, for making it so. We've learned a lot from all of you this evening; we've been taken behind the scenes in the State Department's post-war planning; we saw how that planning became foreign policy in action at the famous Moscow Conference; and we've had a chance to get some important questions answered.

Next week, ladies and gentlemen, I have another fine group of interviews lined up, with Under Secretary Stettinius, Assistant Secretary Shaw, Ambassador Winant, who will talk to us from London, and Ambassador Robert D. Murphy. Our general topic will be "The Organization of the State Department and the Foreign Service". Some questions I intend getting the answers to are: How much wealth must a young man possess before he can hope to get a position in our Foreign Service? Is it true that the graduates of one or two particular universities are favored as candidates over others? What kind of work is done by the men and women in our Foreign Service? What salaries do we pay them? And so forth, and so forth. If there are any questions that occur to *you*, won't you send them to me immediately? They'll help me to slant my interviews. And now—till next Saturday evening at the same time—this is Richard Harkness saying "Good night" from Washington.

»» January 15, 1944 ««

PARTICIPANTS

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, Jr.	Under Secretary of State
G. HOWLAND SHAW	Assistant Secretary of State
JOHN G. WINANT	United States Ambassador to London (speaking from London)
ROBERT D. MURPHY	United States Ambassador at Large; American member of the Advisory Council for Italy
RICHARD HARKNESS	Representing the public

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: For the American people, the National Broadcasting Company presents the second of a limited series of programs called "The State Department Speaks". We go now to the State Department Building on Pennsylvania Avenue here in Washington, D.C.

HARKNESS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Richard Harkness—your representative in this timely series of programs designed to tell you something about your State Department—how it works, the work it does, and the people who run it. Here in the Secretary of State's office on the second floor of the old State Department Building, I am ready to interview for you such well-known people as Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State; G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State; John G. Winant, American Ambassador to Great Britain, who will speak to us from London; and Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who has just returned to this country from some very exciting experiences abroad.

To begin with, thanks to you listeners for your cards and letters suggesting questions I

should ask on these programs. They've been most helpful. Keep them coming!

Now let's try getting some of your questions answered. First, those questions having to do with the set-up of the State Department and its work. And here are two men who can speak with authority—Under Secretary Stettinius and Assistant Secretary Shaw.

Mr. Stettinius, I understand you have something interesting to tell us tonight concerning two important announcements which Secretary Hull made today.

STETTINIUS: Yes, Mr. Harkness, I have.

HARKNESS: Good! But before we go into that, I'd like to get a brief picture of the State Department's work. Mr. Shaw, you're the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the administration of the Department and of our Foreign Service. Suppose you give us that picture, Sir.

SHAW: In brief, Mr. Harkness, the business of the State Department is to represent this country in our dealings with foreign governments in matters covering many of the most momentous problems of the day.

HARKNESS: Like the Moscow Conference, for instance?

SHAW: Yes—and such things as the negotiation of bases for our armed forces, the conclusion of many treaties and commercial agreements. But in addition the State Department does a great deal of work having little or nothing to do with foreign governments. Actually, most of our daily business is with Americans who come in to ask us to do all sorts of things for them. We maintain daily contacts with Congress and keep in touch with American public opinion as a whole. Furthermore, normally a large part of our work is with other departments of our Government: for instance, getting information on foreign markets which the Department of Commerce distributes to American businessmen; getting data on foreign labor con-

ditions for the use of our Labor Department; getting information abroad for the use of our Agriculture Department to be used in world-crop forecasting. Today in war we work especially closely with these departments and other agencies of the Government in economic-warfare work, the acquisition of needed materials from abroad, and a multitude of other wartime activities.

HARKNESS: Well, I suppose it is the State Department Foreign Service that actually carries out many of these jobs in foreign countries.

SHAW: That's right. But it's called the Foreign Service of the United States and *not* the Foreign Service of the Department of State. Our Foreign Service officers receive their commissions, not from the Secretary of State, but from the President of the United States. They serve the Government of the United States as a whole. These men are the eyes and ears of our Government in foreign lands, the advocates of its interests, and the interpreters of its ideals.

HARKNESS: Serving our country abroad would seem to me to require a pretty able American.

SHAW: It certainly does. Our work today demands able men with many different skills—men with many kinds of experience. Their wartime duties have been particularly exacting as I'm sure Ambassador Winant and Ambassador Murphy will tell you later.

HARKNESS: All right. Now, Mr. Shaw, many of our listeners have sent questions asking whether to get a job in our Foreign Service you have to come from the so-called "right" social background, have the right-size bank account, have gone to the right schools, and be a native of the eastern section of the United States. Is there any truth in that, Sir?

SHAW: No, there is not. Let me answer you point by point, Mr. Harkness, and with concrete facts. Let's start with that eastern seaboard myth. Of the last three groups of 117 persons to enter the Foreign Service, 19 came from the

Far West; 33 from the Middle West; 16 from New England; 33 from the Middle Atlantic States, and 16 from the South. So you see they were pretty well scattered geographically throughout the country. And that's true not only of the last three groups to enter the Service but of the men who came in during the past 10 years. Moreover, these men came from not just one or two schools, but from over 50 different universities and colleges. And—so far as earlier schooling was concerned—at least half of them received their education in our public high schools. Many of our men have worked their way through school. One young man who entered the Foreign Service recently, prepared for his examinations by studying nights in the Detroit Public Library. To support himself he worked during the day on the assembly line of an automobile plant.

HARKNESS: That's interesting and good to hear. But, Mr. Shaw, how about the general opinion that a man needs a private income and—well—the so-called “right” kind of social background to enter the Foreign Service?

SHAW: Neither one of these statements is true, Mr. Harkness. The vast majority of men in the Foreign Service today have no independent income whatever and must rely entirely on their government pay. Now about this “social background” business. The truth is that we want the Service to be broadly representative of American life. I can answer that question again in terms of the last groups of new men to enter our Foreign Service: The fathers of these young men followed such varied occupations as railroad conductor, carpenter, minister of religion, schoolmaster, banker, jeweler, laborer, lawyer, sales manager, clerk, and physician.

HARKNESS: Well, that list seems to spike another rumor, Mr. Shaw. But how did you go about selecting Foreign Service officers?

SHAW: Through a good stiff examination.

HARKNESS: Just how tough is it?

SHAW: Well, only about one out of seventeen passes the test. If they've got the stuff, we want them in the Foreign Service. If they haven't got the stuff, we don't want them, no matter what else they have—money, degrees, or name.

HARKNESS: That's good American doctrine.

SHAW: Yes, and it results in giving us men who are a cross-section of all America, and that's *just* what we're after.

HARKNESS: Before we went on the air, Mr. Shaw, you said something about not doing any recruiting for the Foreign Service just now because the men you would want are going into the armed services. What are your plans for the future on this?

SHAW: I am glad you brought that up, Mr. Harkness, because just as soon as the war is over we will be needing new men in the Service and we will look first to the returning soldiers to fill our ranks.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Shaw. Right now I want to call in London to ask one of our most distinguished ambassadors abroad to tell us something about his job of representing 130 million people. Can you hear me, Ambassador Winant in London?

WINANT: Thank you, I can, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: Well, to begin with, would you tell us something about your work and the people you have to work with as American Ambassador in London?

WINANT: It has been customary over long periods of time for governments to communicate with one another through embassies. I have charge of the United States Embassy in London. The two men I work most closely with are the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden. We work together as freely and as frankly as any three people can work together. There is no unnecessary formality, but always an honest effort to get the job done, whatever the job may be.

HARKNESS: I have a hunch that yours is a mighty tough and complex job, and I wish you could tell us briefly something about it.

WINANT: In wartime, with Great Britain and the United States coordinating production and supply and fighting under a common command, the area of coverage and the volume of business have been enormously expanded. Modern warfare, which involves entire populations of countries, has forced the establishment of civilian war agencies which are represented and coordinated within the London Embassy organization for the European theater of operations.

The backbone of the Embassy organization are the career Foreign Service officers. They are selfless, efficient, and hardworking. Aside from handling relationships between governments, our assignments include obtaining bases and other facilities for our Army and Navy, dealing with supplies through Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease so that the right food and the right weapons are in the right place at the right time, whether they are to be used by our Allies' forces or our own. They include production problems and civil-use problems; economic warfare, which means finding ways and means of depriving the enemy of supplies he vitally needs; and psychological warfare, which includes laying down by leaflet and radio a barrage of truth against enemy propaganda; information services; and other necessary activities to meet war needs.

There are inconveniences and some hardships, especially for those men in the Foreign Service who have been for years away from home, but there is not a man here who does not see that life lies back of the work he is doing and is not grateful for the chance to serve the fighting men.

We have tried hard to be useful to the soldiers, the sailors, and the airmen who today are your true ambassadors to England, just as the true embassies are the brave homes they come from.

It is on the relationship that they are building that the future of the world must largely rest.

A tribute in the *London Daily Express* to the American airmen who died on a recent raid over Germany will give you some understanding of the respect and friendship of the British people for our fighting men. The newspaper said:

"It was, alas, easy to tell yesterday where the hearts of the British people turned in regard to America—to the homes of the lost airmen from Maine to California, to the forests and the prairies, the city apartments and the homesteads in the clearings. The loss of sixty flying fortresses over Schweinfurt struck us as if it were our own. Wherefore came these gallant crews among us? Why did they wing their way to our side? These splendid young Americans flew in aid of the common cause of basic decency in the world just as their soldiers stand alongside ours in Italy or in the Solomons for no other purpose. They came on a rendezvous with us to rid the earth of Nazi terror as we shall be found shoulder to shoulder with them cleansing it of the Jap horror. That is what lasts."

HARKNESS: Thank you, Ambassador Winant. Good night.

WINANT: Good night to you all.

HARKNESS: And now back to the second ranking officer of the Department of State. Mr. Stettinius, you became Under Secretary of State early last fall, did you not?

STETTINIUS: Yes, Mr. Harkness, in October.

HARKNESS: And how long did it take you, Sir, to find your way around in this new position? I know that, right after you took office, Secretary Hull left for the Moscow Conference, which meant that you became Acting Secretary of State right away.

STETTINIUS: Yes, that's right. And under very strenuous circumstances which, I can assure you, gave me an excellent opportunity to become quickly acquainted with the work of the Department and its people.

HARKNESS: What were your reactions? You came into the Department as an experienced businessman and Government official, and I assume you brought a fresh viewpoint with you.

STETTINIUS: I came here as Under Secretary, first with a profound admiration for Secretary Hull and, secondly, with an open mind about the task ahead. It was then my judgment—it is now my definite knowledge—that the State Department is a basically sound institution. It has as its leader one of the great Americans of our time, Cordell Hull; it has an experienced and loyal staff; and it represents a country whose purposes are honorable and aboveboard. In my opinion any foreign office which possesses these assets is basically sound.

HARKNESS: Am I to understand then, Mr. Stettinius, that you are completely satisfied with everything about the present State Department set-up?

STETTINIUS: No, I am not. And I might add that neither is Secretary Hull nor our associates. Like many businesses, the State Department has had to convert its normal operations to war conditions. That always means making rapid administrative changes and the result is there are bound to be rough spots. And, to complete the circle of change, the Department must prepare itself to turn its full facilities again to the problems of the peace.

HARKNESS: Well—Are you getting ready for that time?

STETTINIUS: Yes, we are. One of the first things I undertook for the Secretary was to study with Assistant Secretary Shaw and other officers how affairs within the Department should best be organized to carry the terrific load of foreign-policy work which faces us in the months and years ahead. I am very happy to say that Secretary Hull today announced a reorganization plan of the Department.

HARKNESS: That's just what I've been wait-

ing for, Mr. Stettinius, since Secretary Hull stated that he had asked you to discuss some of the highlights of the plan tonight. Won't you, please, tell us a little about it?

STETTINIUS: Well, of course, everyone will realize that we need as efficient and smooth-running a State Department as possible for the great tasks before us.

HARKNESS: Of course. What does the reorganization accomplish?

STETTINIUS: The new organization corrects some current difficulties, but its chief purpose is to prepare us to meet most effectively the heavy responsibilities which are ahead both for winning the war and making a secure peace.

The new organization accomplishes several objectives: First, it readjusts the responsibilities of the top officers of the Department so that they may devote the biggest part of their energies to vital world affairs.

HARKNESS: Well, you mean then they are being relieved of some of the administrative details which have tied them down up to now?

STETTINIUS: That's right; and, secondly, the new organization establishes clearer lines of responsibility and authority inside the Department. To do this we have revamped and regrouped many of the activities.

In the third place, the work of the higher officers of the Department will be more closely coordinated.

HARKNESS: Well, now, Sir, is there anything you can say concretely about this?

STETTINIUS: Yes, one of the most important steps being taken is the establishment of two principal committees composed of high officers of the Department. Secretary Hull will be Chairman and I, Vice Chairman of these committees. One will be a Policy Committee which will be concerned with the full scope of our international affairs.

HARKNESS: And what is the second of these principal committees, Sir?

STETTINIUS: That is to be called the Committee on Post War Programs. It will formulate and submit to the President recommendations pertaining to post-war foreign policy.

HARKNESS: That means, I take it, that all foreign-policy matters, both current and future plans, will now be cleared and coordinated through these two committees.

STETTINIUS: That is correct, but I wish to emphasize that the final important purpose of the reorganization is to establish new divisions to deal with new problems of an international nature.

HARKNESS: I notice that on the chart you have there before you, Mr. Stettinius, one of these new divisions is that of Labor Relations—would that be a concrete illustration of that last point you made?

STETTINIUS: Precisely—but with our limited time, we'd better not get started on these details here tonight, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: Well, I wish we could, but I certainly want to thank you, Mr. Stettinius, for that important piece of news and your comments on its significant features. But we almost forgot to touch on that other important announcement which will be of interest to our audience.

STETTINIUS: Today Secretary Hull created an Advisory Council on Post War Foreign Policy to be composed of outstanding and representative national leaders. This Council will advise the Secretary of State on post-war foreign-policy matters of major importance.

HARKNESS: Secretary Hull has already named several outstanding citizens to serve on this Council, hasn't he?

STETTINIUS: Yes. He has appointed Mr. Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the American Red Cross; Ambassador Myron C. Taylor; and Dr. Isaiah Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins University, as Vice Chairmen of the Council.

HARKNESS: Before we tackle Ambassador

Robert D. Murphy may I ask a final question, Sir, on the reorganization: Will it work?

STETTINIUS: It must work, Mr. Harkness, and I can assure you that it is Secretary Hull's firm intention and mine to leave no stone unturned, as time goes on, to see that our State Department is fully equipped to discharge its responsibilities to the American people in the days ahead.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, here's Ambassador Robert D. Murphy—the man you'll remember reading about as having arranged for General Mark Clark's secret visit to North Africa before the landing of Eisenhower's armies. Mr. Murphy, can you tell us something about that visit—the time the General had the bad luck to lose those now famous pants of his?

MURPHY: Well, a couple of weeks before our troops landed, it was decided that General Clark and several other officers would make a secret visit to North Africa to get some first-hand ideas of what reception our forces would get from the French when they landed. We made very careful preparations with certain patriotic Frenchmen for this visit. As you all know, General Clark and his staff came ashore in the dead of night at an isolated spot and successfully completed their mission in spite of a threat of discovery by local police officials.

HARKNESS: Well, how about those pants?

MURPHY: Oh, about the pants. It was in making his get-away to the submarine that the General had to leave his pants on the beach. When we went down to remove all evidences of the visit after the General had gotten away, I found, among other things, his pants.

HARKNESS: What do you do with a pair of general's pants?

MURPHY: Just what I would have done with the pants of any other friend under similar circumstances—I had them cleaned and pressed, and radioed the General that they'd be there for him when he came back.

HARKNESS: And as we all know, the General did come back. But this time he had plenty of company with him—Eisenhower and his gallant armies. I would like to get from you, Mr. Murphy, some of the background of that landing. In our pre-broadcast chat, you said that during 1940, 1941, and 1942, when our military preparations needed time and our power structure was weak, you worked to inspire French faith in us. Why the lack of French faith in us then?

MURPHY: Because, in 1941, many Frenchmen in North Africa honestly believed that the United States would never succeed in preparing for war in time to stop Germany. We eventually got this idea out of their heads, but military preparation takes a long time and those anxious months seemed endless to us.

HARKNESS: The proof that you laid a firm foundation came with the successful landing of our troops in November 1942. But I recall that you were severely criticized for dealing with so-called "Vichyites" in North Africa before the invasion. Now, you know on this program there are no holds barred. I want to ask you: *Did you deal with such people?*

MURPHY: You bet we did, Mr. Harkness! When you're working inside a cage with a tiger, your technique has to be quite different from that of the independent and carefree critic standing safely outside. Remember always that we were operating in a zone of strong enemy influence. It was inevitable at times that we were obliged to cultivate and associate with people for whose politics we had no sympathy. That association did not mean that we approved the point of view of certain French elements who happened to exercise authority at the time—but these Frenchmen were indispensable in preparing for the landing of our forces in Africa, and so we dealt with them. I would like to point out, however, something that has not always been clearly understood up to now and that is that certain so-called "Vichy-

ites" remained loyal to Vichy on the surface only so they could help us in preparing the way for the arrival of our troops and the eventual liberation of France.

HARKNESS: That's an important point.

MURPHY: But in any case I will cheerfully admit that for the purpose of saving the lives of the American boys whom I saw come over the beaches of North Africa I would deal with any person desirable or undesirable. I knew that once our power was established, my Government would cooperate with the French in the reestablishment of democratic institutions. But first things come first. I knew I could not face the mothers and wives of our soldiers who might be killed by reason of any reluctance on our part which would have prevented the practical arrangements under which our soldiers were protected.

HARKNESS: Well, I think our listeners who have sons and brothers and husbands in the front line tonight well understand that viewpoint. What was your work after the invasion took place, Mr. Murphy?

MURPHY: I was then assigned to the Allied Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower, as a member of his staff.

HARKNESS: That was the first time that a Foreign Service officer ever became a member of a military staff, wasn't it?

MURPHY: I believe it was.

HARKNESS: Eisenhower must be a great fellow to serve with.

MURPHY: Indeed he is. I can't praise him too highly. His cool and sound judgment, his genial personality, were the dominating factors behind the extraordinary cooperation between the Allies in North Africa during the most critical moments of the war.

HARKNESS: Mr. Murphy, I want to ask you about the Darlan affair. You remember there were a lot of people over here saying that we were backing the wrong horse after our troops

had landed in dealing with Vichyite Darlan instead of Free French de Gaulle. They felt that General de Gaulle was being shunted aside, to put it bluntly.

MURPHY: Yes, I know about that reaction and I don't mind telling you that I was flabbergasted by it.

HARKNESS: You were? Why?

MURPHY: You must remember that the whole aim of our foreign policy in North Africa at that time was to save as many American lives as possible, and to do everything in our power to gain a quick and inexpensive victory. True, General de Gaulle was already in the war, and he and his men deserve every credit for having maintained French honor and for carrying on the fight during those bitter months. But don't forget this—at the time of the American landing, Admiral Darlan had at his command 300,000 soldiers and sailors in Africa while General de Gaulle then had only a handful by comparison. That's why we worked with Admiral Darlan. And I can tell you that he rendered very practical assistance to the Allied cause. Perhaps the best proof of this is found in the fact that, whereas our Army leaders expected the casualty list of the North African landing to run to 15,000, it actually was well under 2,000, including Army and Navy.

HARKNESS: Well, that answers quite a few questions straight from the shoulder, Mr. Murphy. Thanks. I might point out to our listeners that Ambassador Robert D. Murphy is one of the few civilians ever to be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. General Eisenhower pinned it on him for the excellent military job he did as head of our Foreign Service in North Africa.

HARKNESS: Let's see how our time is. I think we have time left for just one more question for you, Mr. Stettinius. Last week on this program we discussed the Moscow Conference, and that broadcast stirred up a large number of

questions from our listeners concerning post-war cooperation with Soviet Russia. You have been a long-standing friend of Soviet Russia, Mr. Stettinius, and you as Lend-Lease Administrator helped to get war materials to Russia. What do you think about cooperation with Soviet Russia after the war?

STETTINIUS: I have worked closely with the Soviet officials here for over three years and I have nothing but admiration for the bravery, resourcefulness, and determination of the people of the Soviet Union. I feel we have everything to gain and nothing to lose from a continuing and close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States both now and after the war. Anything else would be nothing less than tragic blundering for both of us.

HARKNESS: Well, time's almost up, so thanks to all of you gentlemen—Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Shaw, Ambassador Murphy, and Ambassador Winant, who burned the midnight oil in London to be with us this evening. Next week the State Department officials in the witness chair will include Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Mr. Dean Acheson—both of whom are Assistant Secretaries of State, and Mr. Harry C. Hawkins, Director of the new Office of Economic Affairs.

I hope all of you ladies and gentlemen listening in will be with us then. Meanwhile, send me your questions. And now—this is Richard Harkness saying "Good night" from Washington.

»» January 22, 1944 ««

PARTICIPANTS

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.	Assistant Secretary of State
DEAN ACHESON	Assistant Secretary of State
HARRY C. HAWKINS	Director, Office of Economic Affairs
CHARLES P. TAFT	Director, Office of Wartime Economic Affairs
RICHARD HARKNESS	Representing the public

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: For the American people, the National Broadcasting Company presents the third of a series of four programs called "The State Department Speaks". We take you now to the State Department Building on Pennsylvania Avenue here in Washington, D.C.

HARKNESS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Richard Harkness, your representative on this series of programs arranged by the National Broadcasting Company with the cooperation of the State Department and designed to reveal in simple terms the work of our Department of State. On the first program of this series we heard about the Moscow Conference and the post-war planning work of the State Department. We were told that in the final analysis the foreign policies of this country are determined by you and me and our neighbors next door. Last Saturday the second program brought us word of a reorganization of the State Department and gave us a close-up of the work of the Department and the United States Foreign Service in protecting and promoting American interests abroad—in war and in peace. Tonight we are going to try to find out about a few of the things which some people say cause wars—in other words, we are going to ask some searching questions about economic relations between nations. We are

going to find out what relation, if any, there is between bread and butter and peace and war; and we have with us four gentlemen who are outstanding experts on the subject: First, there's Mr. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. How do you do, Mr. Berle.

BERLE: Good evening, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: And Mr. Dean Acheson, also an Assistant Secretary. Welcome to our program, Mr. Acheson.

ACHESON: Thank you, Mr. Harkness. I'm glad to be here.

HARKNESS: Then we have Mr. Harry C. Hawkins, Director of the State Department's Office of Economic Affairs, and Mr. Charles P. Taft, who is the Director of the Department's Office of Wartime Economic Affairs. Good evening, gentlemen.

HAWKINS and TAFT: Good evening, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: All right—let's get on.

Mr. Acheson, you are the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of economic affairs.

ACHESON: That's right, Mr. Harkness.

HARKNESS: Well, suppose we start off by asking you a question that must be in the minds of many of our listeners, and that is: Why is the Department of State interested in such a dry, unlikely sounding subject as economics?

ACHESON: I think we can convince you that it's not a dry, unlikely subject, Mr. Harkness. And I'm sure we can demonstrate how important international economics are to all Americans—the farmer in Iowa, the banker in San Francisco, the miner in Pennsylvania—in war and in peace.

HARKNESS: Good! But first, tell me your definition of "economics". I don't want any dictionary definition, as you can well understand.

ACHESON: Surely, Mr. Harkness. I use the word "economics" as an over-all term for producing things, moving them, and using them.

The international wartime economic problem of the United Nations is to bring these things to bear against the Axis with maximum effectiveness. Our own and our Allies' armies and peoples have to be fed, clothed, and furnished with thousands of articles—"things", I called them a moment ago—all the equipment of a soldier, all the equipment of a ship, and all the equipment and food and clothing that people require in their ordinary daily lives.

To produce all these things and to move them to the right places, in the right amounts, at the right times—all under stress of a gigantic war effort—to do all this we need the help of other governments and peoples. It's the purpose of our foreign economic policy in wartime to work things out with other countries in such a way that we and our Allies get the help we need and that our enemies don't get it. I'd like to make this point clear: In all these problems, the State Department works closely with the Foreign Economic Administration. Between them, they carry out almost all of the foreign economic operations of the United States Government.

HARKNESS: How do you go about doing this?

ACHESON: Well, you've two different situations to keep in mind, Mr. Harkness. First, you've the countries which are allied or associated with us in this war. Secondly, there are the neutral countries. With the first or allied group, we have arranged for a mutual stepping-up of all essential production, for cutting down—so far as possible—all non-essential production, and finally, for refusing to send anything to places where it might reach the enemy.

HARKNESS: That's in the case of allied nations, Mr. Acheson. Now—how about the neutral countries?

ACHESON: Here our task is much more difficult. These countries, unlike our Allies and associated nations, are *not* joined with us in the fight against the Axis. But *we* have things

which *they* want badly, and *they* have things which *we* want badly—so this gives us the chance to drive a bargain.

HARKNESS: Yes, but what do we do about keeping these neutral countries from supplying the enemy with materials he needs?

ACHESON: Well, that's where we have to do some mighty *hard* bargaining, and such hard bargaining is a part of our campaign of economic warfare.

HARKNESS: Mr. Acheson, please! Before we go any further, suppose you explain that much used term "economic warfare". What does it mean?

ACHESON: It means simply hurting the enemy by preventing him from getting the things he needs. Economic warfare is carried on in many ways: By the Navy, which prevents ships from taking things to the enemy; by the air forces, which destroy enemy factories; and by the civilian agencies, which interfere with the enemy's getting supplies from neutral countries. One method by which the civilians work is these war-trade bargains—this *hard* bargaining with the neutrals which I mentioned a moment ago.

HARKNESS: What is the general nature of those bargains? I realize you can't go into the particulars because of possible aid to the enemy, but maybe—

ACHESON: Well, take a material which is essential to the German arms industry and which it gets from a nearby neutral country. Our air forces and the R. A. F. bomb the German arms factories. This interferes with home production. But that isn't enough. We must see to it that the lost production of those bombed-out factories is not replaced from neutral countries; and, too, we must also see to it that materials on which German factories depend don't get to Germany from other countries.

HARKNESS: Well, that's understandable, Mr.

Secretary, but you still haven't told us what you do in that case. How do you *stop* the material getting from a neutral country to Germany?

ACHESON: Well, let's take a concrete example. If a neutral country which supplies material to Germany needs food or oil or anything else from us we say to them, "You can have the things you need from us only if you stop sending such and such a war material to Germany."

HARKNESS: Well, suppose they tell you that they have to sell the war material to Germany in order to live?

ACHESON: In that case, we are willing to buy it from them. Sometimes we really want the material, and sometimes we don't, but we don't care about that—the big point is to keep the valuable war material away from the enemy whether we need it or not.

HARKNESS: I see. Well, Mr. Acheson, let's leave the economic-warfare measures for a little bit and consider what our State Department is doing in the economic field for the period after the war. Isn't it true that we have begun while the war is still on to deal with post-war problems?

ACHESON: Yes, you just can't wait until the last gun is fired to begin preparing for the economic conditions which you know will be present when the war ends. When that day comes, the populations of countries which have been occupied by the enemy will once more be free, but they will be free in a pitiable condition. The enemy is now using their work, their railroads and factories and farms, and their products for his own benefit. It's *his* selfish system that's in operation there. You can see then that, on the day the enemy is driven out, the whole system will fall to pieces, and it will take some time to put it together again so that it will operate for the benefit of the liberated peoples. If a band of thugs moved into your house and wrecked it, you wouldn't expect to find

things in working order the day the police drove them out.

HARKNESS: That's true.

ACHESON: So inevitably some time must elapse before production in these occupied countries can get going again. This will be an extremely critical time. During this period the people of these countries must have the things which are necessary to keep them alive and to hold them together. If they don't get these materials, the result will be wide-spread starvation and disease; starvation and disease will produce rioting and disorder; and you can't build a peace in the midst of chaos. To prevent this, the United Nations must agree now upon ways and means to help those countries get on their feet again.

HARKNESS: Well, Mr. Secretary, there has been quite a bit of agreement on these ways and means already, hasn't there?

ACHESON: Yes, indeed, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is one of the best examples. That organization—called UNRRA for short—was created last November after negotiations carried on by the State Department. Forty-four United and Associated Nations signed the agreement which set it up. The Council of this organization had its first meeting at Atlantic City a couple of months ago.

HARKNESS: Yes, I know. I covered that conference for NBC, and, as I recall, you were elected Chairman of the First Session of the Council of the UNRRA organization.

ACHESON: That's correct. You'll recall, also, Mr. Harkness, that we adopted a realistic program for bringing relief and rehabilitation to the areas which are being liberated from the Axis.

HARKNESS: Yes, I know you did, and that brings something to mind, Mr. Acheson. Some people are referring to this program as a case of the United States playing Santa Claus again. Is there any truth in that, Sir?

ACHESON: In my opinion, there is not! There is always a strong temptation to place discussions of this sort upon a purely materialistic basis and to say we ought to do this from a hard-headed point of view and that it will pay good dividends. That is true, but it always seems to me that that is not the way in which we American people approach a question, or the way in which a question is really illuminated. Unless people have interest in other peoples of the world we are going to have disaster. In order to feel happy with itself a people must take action of this sort, and it is only when they are willing to do so that a people have a right to leadership in the world. And finally we are not doing more than our part since *all* the United Nations are contributing to this work on an equitable basis.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Acheson—we'll get back to you in a few moments. Now a question or two for Mr. Taft. Mr. Taft, you are the new Director of Wartime Economic Affairs. I take it that means you handle the State Department's end of the economic-warfare work which Mr. Acheson mentioned earlier.

TAFT: Right.

HARKNESS: I imagine you have a lot of headaches on that job?

TAFT: Right again, and they vary more than you can possibly imagine.

HARKNESS: Give me a few examples, Mr. Taft, won't you?

TAFT: Well, to pick one at random, there is the so-called "black list" work. The black list is another weapon of economic warfare. It is an especially important weapon in these days of total war. Long before they began their military aggression, the Nazis had organized a network of Nazi sympathizers in other countries to bore from within. They were very active in the countries of this hemisphere, and, what's worse, many of them were making their living off of American trade.

HARKNESS: Just what do you mean by that, Mr. Taft?

TAFT: Just that. A large number of German Nazi firms in South America were living off of the business which they had with the United States. At the same time these firms were contributing a large share of their profits for propaganda and other subversive activities against the United States and hemispheric unity.

HARKNESS: Well, how would these pro-Nazi businessmen go about their subversive activities?

TAFT: Let me give you just one actual case. There was one big company in one of the South American countries. This company was the agent for a large United States concern and received *from* the United States firm a sizeable advertising appropriation.

HARKNESS: And what did they do with it?

TAFT: They used this money to advertise the United States company's products. But they made sure never to place this advertising money with any papers except those which were Nazi mouthpieces.

HARKNESS: You know, Mr. Taft, that sounds almost like dime detective fiction.

TAFT: It may sound that way, Mr. Harkness, but our files are filled with thousands of cases of similar Nazi practices.

HARKNESS: Well, how does the black list deal with such people?

TAFT: When we learned about that firm I just mentioned, we put them on our published black list—more formally known as the Proclaimed List. By this action the firm lost its agency and all its United States business accounts. It couldn't buy from us or sell to us, nor could it use our banks or our mails. And while that firm remains on our black list anyone who deals with it runs the risk of being put on the list himself.

HARKNESS: Well, Mr. Taft, that's one kind

of economic warfare which *all* of us can understand—including the Nazis and their Fifth Columnists. Oh, by the way—how many names are on that black list today?

TAFT: Over fifteen thousand.

HARKNESS: Good enough. Thank you, Sir. And now, here's something I want to say:

Ladies and gentlemen, before we came on the air tonight, a man said to me that, in his opinion, there might have been no World War II if the statesmen who made and carried out the peace terms after World War I had paid as much attention to economic matters as they did to such things as political boundaries.

That man was Harry C. Hawkins, Director of the Office of Economic Affairs of the Department of State.

All right, Mr. Hawkins—explain, please!

HAWKINS: Gladly, Mr. Harkness. Let me start by saying that I think it is critically important that we Americans never lose sight of some of the truths the past 25 years have taught us. The most important of these truths is that no political and military structure for maintaining peace can stand for long if the nations of the world are engaged in trade warfare.

HARKNESS: What do you mean by "trade warfare" between nations, Mr. Hawkins? You're speaking of normal times now and not of economic warfare such as Mr. Acheson just described, are you not?

HAWKINS: Yes, Mr. Harkness, I am speaking of the so-called "normal times", but I really meant what I said when I used the term "trade warfare". Many of the trade-warfare methods used by the nations against each other in the twenties and early thirties were only slightly less unfriendly in effect than many of the economic-warfare measures which we're using against our enemies today!

HARKNESS: Well, that's calling a spade a spade. But what were some of these peacetime trade-warfare measures?

HAWKINS: Well, in one form or another, they were trade barriers against goods coming from another country. High tariffs and quotas are common forms of trade barriers. And there are also discriminations of various kinds. I mean by that the deals made between some nations to the detriment of others. And these other countries often retaliated, of course.

HARKNESS: What countries were to blame for all this?

HAWKINS: Well, it's impossible to assess degrees of blame, but *we* were no better than the rest. We caused our full share of the trouble.

HARKNESS: Well, just how do these trade-warfare measures work against international peace?

HAWKINS: They create serious economic headaches in other countries by depriving the producers in those countries of an outlet for their products. When countries can't sell their products abroad they have to stop buying from abroad, and so it goes until every country is refusing to buy every other country's goods. International bitterness and non-cooperation are the result.

HARKNESS: Well, wait a minute, Mr. Hawkins—this international bitterness, you speak of—it doesn't necessarily mean war, does it?

HAWKINS: No—not of itself. But, when nations are trading economic blows that create unemployment and breadlines and are continually hitting each other's vital interests, they are not likely to cooperate to keep the peace.

HARKNESS: I suppose not—but—let's get down to cases, Mr. Hawkins. Do you believe that in order to have peace, we must do away with all trade barriers? that we've got to have world-wide free-trade?

HAWKINS: No, I do not. Trade cooperation does not mean free trade. It does mean that nations must get together and work out their international economic policies in a spirit of mutual understanding. It does mean the re-

duction of excessive trade barriers and doing away with trade discriminations between nations.

HARKNESS: Well, so far we've been speaking of the relationship between sound trade policies and peace, Mr. Hawkins. But there's another point that a great many of our listeners want discussed. That is, how much, if any, economic sacrifice do these policies mean for us? In other words, how much is post-war trade cooperation going to cost us?

HAWKINS: I don't think it'll cost us anything. On the contrary, I think we'll benefit by it. In the first place we'd benefit immeasurably in dollars and cents if these policies turned out to be insurance against another war. It's well to ask ourselves the sobering question whether this nation could afford another war within the next 25 years.

HARKNESS: What do you think about that?

HAWKINS: Well, personally, I don't think it could and still remain anything like the nation it is now. But let's look at the more immediate dollars-and-cents aspects. Let's look at it from the viewpoints of the farmer, the businessman, and the worker.

Take the needs of our agriculture as a whole. Our home market alone cannot provide an adequate standard of living for our farmers—they must be able to share in the *world* market.

Next—take our manufacturing industries. They are going to need peacetime markets on a scale we have never had before. Our industrial leaders know that only the great world market has potentialities corresponding to our need.

And finally, what is labor's stake in our international trade policies? Many of our labor leaders have made it clear that they are looking ahead and that they see security and opportunity for labor in terms of expanding activity of industry based upon reciprocity in international trade.

HARKNESS: Let me ask a question there, Mr. Hawkins. What's so terrific about this world market that seems to mean so much to our agricultural, business, and labor leaders? What potentialities does it have?

HAWKINS: Well, Mr. Harkness, the world outside the United States has a population of more than two billion people—that's 15 times the population of this country! Many millions of these people are customers whose living standards and purchasing-power are comparable to our own.

HARKNESS: Yes, but the vast majority are poor as church mice, aren't they?

HAWKINS: True, the great majority *are* extremely poor—by our standards—but, though their individual ability to buy our products is limited, in the aggregate their purchases are very large.

HARKNESS: In other words—farmers, industry, and labor—they're all interested in a world market. All right—what's necessary in order to develop this world market?

HAWKINS: Willingness to be paid.

HARKNESS: Willingness to be paid? What do you mean? Why would we refuse to be paid for what we sell?

HAWKINS: Well, we do just that when we shut out goods from other countries. The only way in which people in other nations can get the dollars to buy our goods is by selling us their goods. If we refuse to buy their goods, they won't have any dollars with which to buy the things we want to sell them.

HARKNESS: Well, that's certainly as clear as anyone could state it. But on the other hand, won't these imports put our own producers out of business? What about the low wages and low living standards abroad? How can *our* producers stand up against that kind of competition?

HAWKINS: This is a point that does need consideration, but it needs thoughtful considera-

tion, not snap judgments based on the easy acceptance of catch phrases.

Competitive ability depends mainly on efficiency of production. Low living standards and low wages do *not* necessarily mean efficient production. In fact, misery and efficiency do not usually go together.

The fact is that although many of our industries pay the highest wages in the world, the unit cost of their product is so low that they can compete successfully in foreign markets where wages are far lower. Low wages are, in fact as well as in logic, usually accompanied by low efficiency. What counts in the competitive world market is total cost per unit of product, not simply labor cost per hour.

HARKNESS: Then, to sum up what you have said——

HAWKINS: All that I have said comes to about this: From whatever angle we view the post-war situation, trade policies of nations, particularly the larger ones, are of key importance. Our farmers, our manufacturers, our workers, all of us as taxpayers and consumers, have a big stake in an expanding world market. And as I've said, trade policies will be an important factor in determining whether we will this time win and retain the peace or blunder headlong into another bitter, costly world war.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

And now we turn to Mr. Adolf Berle, who is an Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. Berle, I'd like to get *your* views on the relationship of peace and sound international economic problems. Won't you sum up the situation as you see it?

BERLE: Well, we've got to remember that it's the everyday activities of men and women which set the big patterns of human behavior. The phrase "foreign relations" describes the end result of a great mass of underlying factors. You are friends with, and work with, other countries because you trade with them on a mutually

satisfactory basis; because your people travel freely and happily there, and their people come freely and happily here; because your ships, your airplanes, your telegraph, your radio, and your journalists can render a real service both abroad and at home.

These are not merely the private adventures of private traders. Their sum total adds up to the result of friendship or coolness; or, in extreme cases, of peace or war.

And so, it's the business of the State Department to try to see that these various activities are so handled that the best interests of the United States are protected and promoted and that, in so doing, we do not threaten or injure the safety and prosperity of other friendly countries.

HARKNESS: That's an interesting summing up of the situation, Mr. Berle. I'd like to ask if you can mention some of the specific problems which are ahead and are receiving attention.

BERLE: Well, for example, there are labor problems of an international nature. The Department's new Division of Labor Relations has been working with the Department of Labor and other interested groups on these matters. Of interest in this connection is the meeting of the International Labor Organization which is to be held on April 20th next at Philadelphia.

Then—to continue—in telecommunication, for instance, there aren't any boundaries because the radio message wouldn't know a boundary if it saw one. Traffic through the air is no longer a novelty—and every country in the world has an interest in air-transport problems. Some of these questions are wholly new in the world's history because they arise out of new discoveries. Their solutions ultimately have to be fitted into the pattern of world organization as it finally emerges. Is the idea of sea power, which stabilized the world for some time, still sound in terms of modern air power? Will international relations be the same when anyone

in any country can talk to anyone in any other country as freely as we used to talk together in the same town?

No country—except in rare circumstances—can afford to be either on the giving or the receiving end of a breadline—permanently. So the principle has to be to find the ways by which the interests of our country can be promoted and at the same time give increased opportunity to other countries to improve their own international life.

These are all parts of the same problem. They come from the fact that economic life throughout the world is pretty closely connected. If the elements work together for general well-being, we have peace. If they struggle against each other, no peace is likely to be lasting.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Berle. Now let's get on to some other questions sent in by our listeners.

HARKNESS: Mr. Hawkins, earlier you spoke about the interest we had in enlarging our markets abroad for American exports. Don't we also have to make sure that we can get certain essential commodities *from* abroad? To be specific, I mean oil. You hear a lot of talk these days about dwindling American oil reserves.

HAWKINS: That's right, Mr. Harkness. We cannot continue to use our American oil even at the rate we have used it in the past without exhausting our supplies. We know that we will have to look abroad for oil. Of course, the primary immediate use for oil is in waging war. But in the years to follow, we will need oil for expanded commercial aviation, greater industrial output, more automobiles, more fuel-oil furnaces, more oil-burning ships, and so on.

HARKNESS: Well, what are we going to do about it?

HAWKINS: The Atlantic Charter provides that all countries shall have access on equal terms to the world's raw materials. That

doesn't apply just to foreign countries. It applies to us as well. Americans are already developing great oil fields abroad. The State Department welcomes and wants to encourage this development. The Department will certainly see to it that the interests of American nationals in foreign oil resources will get an even break.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. Acheson, do you agree with Mr. Hawkins that our oil supply is so precious that we need to augment it as much as possible with foreign oil to conserve what we have over here?

ACHESON: Yes, I most certainly do.

HARKNESS: All right, Sir—then answer *this* question. A great many of our listeners ask why, if our oil supplies are so scanty, do we send this precious fuel to Spain?

ACHESON: Well, Mr. Harkness, this is one of the cases we were discussing a few minutes ago—where we bargain with neutral countries for products which both we and our enemies want. Do you recall that?

HARKNESS: Yes.

ACHESON: Well, that's the reason for our sending oil to Spain.

HARKNESS: Oh, I get it! But there's another answer I want—to satisfy many more of our listeners. These people are fearful that the oil we are sending to Spain is getting into the hands of Germany. What have you to say about that, Mr. Taft?

TAFT: I will be glad to answer that, Mr. Harkness. By way of background I should say that the oil which is going from this hemisphere to Spain does not come from continental United States but from the Caribbean area and is carried not in *our* ships but in Spanish ships. So far as its getting into the hands of the enemy—we have taken full precautions to see that this does not occur. The tankers are checked at the port of lading and again at the port of discharge by our own observers. In addition to most formal assurances from the Spanish Gov-

ernment that the oil so furnished will not be re-exported from Spain, we maintain in Spain a staff of observers whose sole duty it is to check the distribution and use of this oil. These controls have been in effect since 1942, and we have received no evidence indicating diversion to enemy destinations or enemy uses. Of course, you understand that quantities of oil which go to Spain in this manner fall far short of that country's normal supply.

HARKNESS: All right, Sir. Well, I guess we've managed to answer quite a number of the questions sent in by our listeners, and I want to thank you gentlemen for appearing here to participate in this show: Mr. Acheson, Mr. Berle, Mr. Hawkins, and Mr. Taft. Next week our line-up of outstanding personalities will include Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Speaker Rayburn of the House of Representatives, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. I hope all of you people listening in will be with us then. And now—this is Richard Harkness saying "Good night" from Washington.

»» January 29, 1944 ««

PARTICIPANTS

CORDELL HULL	Secretary of State
SAM RAYBURN	Speaker of the House of Representatives
TOM CONNALLY	United States Senator, Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate
ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG	United States Senator, Member of Committee on Foreign Relations of United States Senate
BRECKINRIDGE LONG	Assistant Secretary of State
RICHARD HARKNESS	Representing the public

WASHINGTON ANNOUNCER: For the American people, the National Broadcasting Company presents the fourth and last of a special series of programs called "The State Department Speaks". We take you now to the State Department Building on Pennsylvania Avenue here in Washington, D. C.

HARKNESS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is Richard Harkness. Tonight, as your representative, I find myself in distinguished company indeed. Seated around this table in the Secretary of State's office are Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senators Tom Connally and Arthur H. Vandenberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. As you can judge from this list, our subject this evening is the important one of the relationship of Congress and the State Department in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy—the role played in these processes by the elected representatives of the people in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Mr. Secretary, won't you say something on this subject?

HULL: From my long experience in both chambers of the Capitol, I know how rightly jealous the Congress is of its constitutional prerogatives, how properly insistent it is upon its full share in the making of foreign policy. I need not tell my three old friends and former colleagues, who are here with me tonight, nor the rest of the members of the House and the Senate, how conscious I am at all times of what I felt when I was located at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. For the past 11 years it has been my pleasure to meet with them often, individually or in groups, here in the Department or at the Capitol, to counsel together frankly and fully on questions concerning the well-being of our country.

Under our system of government, the safeguarding and promotion of the nation's interests is a joint responsibility of the Executive and the Legislature. Neither can be effective without the other, and the two together can be effective only when there exists between them mutual trust and confidence. In peace and in war, the two branches of the Government are joint trustees for the country's destiny.

All of us are facing today truly unprecedented war tasks.

In this struggle, the Executive and the Congress have one thought, and one only: To do everything that may be needed to bring the war to a victorious end as rapidly as possible. America stands today in the panoply of vast power dedicated solely and whole-heartedly to the utter defeat of our enemies. Dark days are still ahead, but there is in our hearts complete confidence that the unremitting efforts and heavy sacrifices of our heroic armed forces and of a nation united at home will bring us complete victory in this war for self-preservation from the forces of embattled evil.

Equally unprecedented tasks will confront our nation and its Government in the difficult days

that will follow the cessation of hostilities. In some ways, the post-war tasks will be scarcely less exacting than those which face us now.

Our supreme task in the future will be to make sure that all this does not happen again.

I firmly believe that this great goal is possible of attainment. To attain it, our nation and the other peace-loving nations must be firmly resolved never to permit differences between them to reach the point of armed conflict, but rather to adjust them by peaceful means. We and the other peace-loving nations must be equally resolved and prepared to use force if necessary—promptly, in adequate measure and with certainty—to prevent or repress acts of aggression by nations which may refuse to be peace-abiding members of the family of nations. Finally, we and the other peace-loving nations must be resolved to cooperate commercially and otherwise in order that there may be created, for all nations and all peoples, greater opportunities and better facilities for political, economic, and social advancement. Such cooperation is essential if there is to be any hope of eliminating the causes of international conflicts.

The Congress, by non-partisan action, and the Executive, through acts and utterances, have placed on record this country's determination that the supreme task of the future shall be successfully accomplished. All of us are acutely aware of the fact that behind this determination is the united will of our people. All of us know that we can be true to the trust reposed in us only if we find effective means of making sure that what is happening today does not happen again.

It is not enough for our nation alone to stand firmly behind the kind of program for peace-keeping that I have briefly described. The achievement of such a program requires united action by many nations. It must be our task to exert to that end every ounce of our influence.

This will require patience, and tolerance, and good-will, and readiness to play our full part, and every other attribute of enlightened leadership. There will be many difficulties to overcome. They can be overcome if our people continue to see clearly that the price of failure is national disaster and if the Congress and the Executive continue to work together.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Secretary Hull. Now, I know that all of us, including yourself, will listen with great interest to what your distinguished friends have to say; and then maybe you'll be kind enough to come back to say another few words. And now, ladies and gentlemen, may I present the first of our guests from Capitol Hill—the respected and esteemed Speaker of the House of Representatives—for 30 years member of Congress for the fourth district of Texas—the Honorable Sam Rayburn.

RAYBURN: For over a century foreign policy was something which held comparatively little interest for most of the American people. Events of the past 30 years have changed this public indifference to intense and deep interest in our foreign affairs. Twice in that time we have poured our blood and our wealth into overseas wars in the defense of our security. Every day the morning paper tells us of some hitherto obscure part of the world where American fighting men—our relatives and friends—have landed and are in grips with the enemy.

We now know, and we must never again forget, that we are directly and vitally involved in world affairs; that henceforth foreign policy concerns not a few diplomats alone but the entire nation and all groups within the nation.

We are, and we intend to remain, a government of the people, and our foreign policy must therefore be backed by the will and convictions of the people.

HARKNESS: Mr. Speaker, as one who occupies

the highest position of responsibility and honor in the House of Representatives, would you please give us your views on the role of the Congress in formulating and carrying out our foreign policy?

RAYBURN: If a successful foreign policy depends upon the continuous participation and support of the whole nation, the Congress as elected representatives of the people has, indeed, an important part to play.

I should like to call to mind some of the actions taken by the Congress, in cooperation with the Executive, in the dark years from 1939 through 1941 to resist the aggressor's designs. The repeal of the arms embargo in 1939, the armament program and the Selective Service Act of 1940, the lend-lease legislation in 1941. These measures have all played an important part in forging the weapons which yesterday threw back and today are beating down our enemies. These all were major acts of foreign policy. They were, moreover, measures of foreign policy which under our form of government could only be undertaken and effectively applied through the cooperation of the Executive and both houses of the Congress.

HARKNESS: What about the future, Mr. Speaker?

RAYBURN: The Congress is now giving attention to the future problems of maintaining the peace and security for which we fight. A few months ago the House of Representatives, by an overwhelming and bipartisan majority, adopted the Fulbright resolution urging the participation of this country in international peace machinery. This striking declaration of the House of Representatives played its full part, I am sure, along with the Connally resolution of the Senate and the momentous Four-Nation Declaration adopted at the Moscow Conference in making clear to the world that this nation stands united behind a foreign policy of effective international cooperation.

The Senate, of course, has its important constitutional function of giving its advice and consent to treaties regulating our relations with other countries. But the House of Representatives has a position in the field of foreign affairs which, perhaps, is not as well understood as it should be. The House which is elected every two years is uniquely representative of the opinions, the hopes, and the fears of the American people in their home communities.

I have already mentioned some recent examples of major foreign-policy measures in which the House of Representatives participated by exercising its legislative powers. There are many others. For example, all tariff bills must originate in the House, and this has meant that such well-known foreign-economic-policy measures as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act are first considered in the House Committee on Ways and Means. Similarly, the Committee on Appropriations of the House maintains the closest touch with the Department of State and aspects of our foreign affairs. It is this Committee which determines in the first instance how much, and for what purposes funds are to be made available to the Department of State and other executive agencies doing foreign-affairs work. These are some of the less widely known phases of the House of Representatives part in the conduct of our foreign relations.

Best known to all is the work of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is this Committee which considered such measures as the repeal of the arms embargo, lend-lease, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Fulbright resolution, and other highly important matters of foreign policy.

In the coming months and years the United States will have many vital decisions to make on the nature of the arrangements which are to be established for the future maintenance of

peace. If these arrangements are to be accepted, if we are to make them effective, they must represent the views and have the sustained support of the American people as a whole. The Congress of the United States—the elected representatives of the American people—will do its share, I am confident, in making the will of the American people effective in the promotion of international peace and well-being.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Speaker Rayburn. Now, I think we should try to get a little insight into the State Department's relations with Congress—from the man who handles that part of the State Department's work—Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. I'm right on that, am I not, Mr. Long? You *are* in charge of congressional relations?

LONG: Yes, Mr. Harkness, I am. But I should add that this is an aspect of the Department's work which also receives a great deal of personal attention from the Secretary himself.

HARKNESS: Well, won't you go right ahead, Mr. Long—tell us—how close *are* the Department's relations with Congress?

LONG: Well, as a matter of practice the officers of the Department are continuously in touch with members of Congress in several ways. First is what might be termed routine business. This consists of matters their constituents are interested in as individuals, including every conceivable need for assistance affecting the interests of citizens abroad. Then, secondly, there are the matters of foreign policy in which the members of Congress have an official interest as legislators.

Also, there are the more formal relationships with the congressional committees. These are the most important phases of all the dealings between the Congress and the Department for, you see, the congressional committees make sure that proposed legislation which might have an effect upon our foreign relations is referred to the Secretary of State for an expression of

views before any proposal is acted upon. These views are submitted by the Department generally in writing for the consideration of the particular congressional committee involved.

HARKNESS: I see; now, how about treaties?

LONG: With treaties the Department has a twofold experience. To begin with, the Department negotiates treaties. They are solemn obligations entered into by our Government with other governments and concern our sovereign rights as a nation. Once negotiated on behalf of the President, they are submitted by the President to the Senate. The Department's second phase then begins. We are then prepared, if requested, to meet with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and present our views and information in support of the provisions of the proposed treaty. Sometimes this is a long procedure. An important treaty necessarily involves a lot of discussion.

HARKNESS: Yes, we all know that in years gone by a number of treaties have been bitterly contested in the Senate. What other contacts do you have with Congress, Mr. Long?

LONG: Well, I might mention those occasions when the officers of the Department discuss *informally* questions of foreign policy with the congressional committees having jurisdiction over foreign affairs.

HARKNESS: You say they discuss these questions, *informally* with the congressional committees. What do you mean by that, Mr. Long?

LONG: By that I mean we have these discussions not in open hearings but in executive sessions of the committees with no stenographer present. As you know we can't always divulge publicly every aspect of our dealings with foreign governments during negotiations, but we well recognize that appropriate members of the Congress should be kept informed. To every practicable extent, we lay the cards on the table and tell the members of committees off the record the things which would be helpful to their

understanding of a particular foreign policy. Under these circumstances we in the State Department have frequently appeared before Senator Connally's Committee on Foreign Relations, of which Senator Vandenberg is a member. Our associations with this committee are cordial, and I think the results have been very good.

HARKNESS: Mr. Long, I'd like to ask you this—you've served abroad as an ambassador and you're now representing the State Department in its relations with Congress. Which of these two jobs requires the most diplomatic talent?

LONG: Mr. Harkness, "diplomatic talent", as you express it, I think is mostly common sense, mixed up with ordinary courtesy, based on an understanding of our country's national interest. Our dealings with members of the Congress are on that basis, and we find that they too have "diplomatic talent".

HARKNESS: That's a nice compliment to your congressional friends, Mr. Long. Thank you, Sir. Now let's hear from another legislator—the distinguished Republican Senator from Michigan, Arthur H. Vandenberg. Senator, as a minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, what are *your* views on the relationship of Congress and the State Department in the formulation and execution of foreign policy?

VANDENBERG: The State Department and the Senate are in a congressional partnership in many aspects of American foreign policy. No one needs to be historically reminded that the Senate has a direct veto on all treaties. They require a two-thirds Senate ratification—and failure of such ratification can and has changed the course of history.

In a broader sense the State Department and Congress as a whole—the House as well as the Senate—are in a constitutional partnership. For example, only the whole Congress, by majority vote in each branch, can declare war.

Again, the House is particularly charged with control of the nation's purse strings—and appropriations are often vital to implement foreign policy (even though we have abandoned some of our old ideas of “dollar diplomacy”).

It is perfectly obvious, on the face of the record, that there should be the closest possible relationship, therefore, and the fullest possible candor between the State Department and the Congress in general and the Senate in particular.

I realize that diplomacy cannot always function in a town meeting and that there are many delicate international negotiations which cannot always be broadcast even to 531 members of the Senate and the House, particularly in time of war. But I profoundly believe that national policy—a “people's foreign policy”—will be surer and safer in proportion as these constitutional partners may draw closer together in the discharge of their mutual functions.

I am happy to join in congratulating Secretary Hull and Chairman Connally of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the progress that has been made in this direction. Senator Connally has brought in many representatives of the State Department to give the Foreign Relations Committee first-hand confidential information regarding foreign situations during the past year. It has been most helpful. It is the working of a practical partnership. I am particularly happy that Assistant Secretary Long is here tonight. He has often represented the State Department upon these occasions; and he is one of our favorite visitors.

HARKNESS: Have you any concrete example, Senator, of the tangible value of these closer relationships?

VANDENBERG: Yes. The usefulness of this liaison is perhaps best illustrated by the recent history of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement between the United

States and 43 foreign powers. At first it was proposed to promulgate this as a simple executive agreement. The Senate promptly—and rightly—rose up on its high horse and said it was a treaty which had to be ratified by the Senate. Instead of fighting out this sterile deadlock, a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee sat down with representatives of the State Department; in mutual contacts they rewrote the agreement to satisfy the Senate it was no longer in the treaty class; it is now being submitted to both branches of Congress as part of a joint resolution of authority for appropriations. We are pulling together instead of pulling apart. That's a fine sample of the partnership cooperation which our "foreign policy" requires.

HARKNESS: Yes, I agree, Sir.

VANDENBERG: I would be less than frank, however, if I did not say that there is still much progress needed in this direction. After carefully studying the State Department's so-called "White Paper"—detailing our relations with Tokyo for 11 months preceding Pearl Harbor—I am bound to say that neither Congress nor the country, nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee itself, had the remotest information or idea about the *realities* that were sweeping us toward inevitable war. Congress cannot legislate intelligently in any such vacuum. I am sure Pearl Harbor wasn't one tenth as much of a surprise to the President and the State Department as it was to the House and Senate and the country. I hasten to repeat that I fully understand that many of these subsequent disclosures could not have been made before. But I also repeat that the nearer we can approach more complete information and understanding among the constitutional partners who must deal with "foreign policy" the safer our course will be.

I commend the State Department's praiseworthy efforts in this vital direction. The need

will infinitely multiply as we approach the peace settlements of this world war. I hope and pray for a community of interest and action, regardless of politics, which will best serve America and stabilized civilization everywhere. Meanwhile, please let me toss an orchid to Secretary Hull, who is one of the truly great characters in modern statesmanship.

HARKNESS: All right, Senator Vandenberg—thank you, Sir. Now, let's hear from one of the best-known men on Capitol Hill—the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—Senator Tom Connally of Texas.

CONNALLY: The most important fact about our being met together here tonight in the Department of State is that it is *not* an unusual meeting. If there were something unusual about members of the Congress meeting with the Secretary of State for discussion of our foreign affairs our nation would, indeed, be in a peculiar state.

The integrity of our form of government rests upon the separation of the legislative and the executive powers. But the welfare of our country demands the intelligent cooperation of these two coordinate and independent branches of our Government. While their functions are independent, yet their objectives are the common good, and cooperation to that end is appropriate.

Let our people always remember that an ineffective government is only less undesirable than a tyrannical government. Tyranny is to be abhorred, but history teaches that tyranny goads a frantic people to freedom. Ineffective government on the other hand not infrequently invites the tyranny of *either* the demagogue or the conqueror.

HARKNESS: Senator Connally, it seems to me that what you've just said is the story of much of Europe during the past 10 years or so.

CONNALLY: I firmly believe it.

HARKNESS: Well, do you feel, Sir, that we've had effective cooperation between the Congress and the Executive in the handling of our foreign affairs?

CONNALLY: If you mean, Mr. Harkness, have we had such cooperation throughout our history I would say that, with the exception of several tragic failures, we have generally had reasonable cooperation between the Congress and the Executive. It was this effective cooperation within our Government that has made it possible for our country to play an effective part in the common cause of the United Nations. Our task, our cause, today is the utter defeat of the Axis. Beyond that is our common ultimate goal—the establishment throughout the world of a just and enduring peace.

Let's make no mistake about it. Neither task will be easy. It will not be easy to bring our enemies to their knees. The blood and treasure which are yet to be poured out in this cause cannot be measured. But we are committed and determined to see it through.

HARKNESS: That's the way we all feel about it, Senator Connally, but where do we stand in your opinion concerning the ultimate task of making sure, as Secretary Hull just put it, "that all this does not happen again"?

CONNALLY: Well, as I just remarked, Mr. Harkness, this also will not be an easy task. But, Heaven forbid any man should ever say that the sublime objective of world peace is impossible! It is not impossible. And it is worth a sublime effort.

Senator Vandenberg has mentioned the constitutional responsibilities of the Senate in the approval of treaties. He has been most gracious in his references to my part in bringing representatives of the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee together for valuable exchanges of views and information on the foreign situation. Let me say that, heavy as are the tasks of the Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they will be borne cheerfully as long as the burden can be shared with colleagues who in this work, regardless of party, have no other interest than the best interest of our country. No member of our committee has approached our common tasks with a greater spirit of helpfulness and national service than has Senator Vandenberg.

Last fall, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I presented to the Senate on behalf of the committee a resolution designed to make clear the intention of the Senate that this country should cooperate with its comrades-in-arms in securing a just and honorable peace and that the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, should join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world. After thorough discussion on the floor of the Senate, the resolution was adopted by an overwhelming vote.

The Senate of the United States has thereby announced to the world its determination that we intend to participate with other peace-seeking nations to keep the peace which we now fight to gain.

HARKNESS: Thank you, Senator Connally. And now back to Secretary Hull.

Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would comment on Senator Vandenberg's statement that neither the Congress nor the country had the remotest information or idea about the realities that were sweeping us toward war. I noticed he also said that he fully understood that many of the subsequent disclosures—such as were made in the State Department's "White Paper"—could not have been made before.

HULL: Senator Vandenberg is a very old friend, and I am always interested in what he has to say. I fully agree with his statement that many of the disclosures subsequently made could not be made before without jeopardizing our

national safety. But we certainly disagree on his first statement. My view is this: The tragedy of our pre-Pearl-Harbor situation lay not in lack of warning as to the steadily approaching dangers to this hemisphere and this country. The President and I and other responsible officials did everything we could by utterance and acts to make clear and emphasize these growing dangers.

If these repeated warnings failed to impress some of our people, I can only explain such failure by the fact that, during that period, too many of our people profoundly believed that no serious danger from foreign wars did or could threaten this country and that about all the nation had to do to keep out of war was to stay at home and mind its own business. It was as impossible to convince these people against this profound conviction they entertained at the time as it would have been to convince them against any other profound belief held by them.

I am sure that we are all now agreed that in this experience lies our greatest lesson for the future. Speaker Rayburn, Senator Connally, Senator Vandenberg, and I are in complete agreement that effective cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government and unflagging alertness on the part of our people to dangers as they threaten are all indispensable to our national safety and well-being.

Before this final program ends, I should like to say a few words of appreciation for the courtesy of the National Broadcasting Company in arranging, through this series, for my associates and myself to speak to the people of this country on matters of such grave concern to all of us. I want to compliment Mr. Harkness for his conduct of the programs. I am deeply grateful to Speaker Rayburn and to Senators Connally and Vandenberg for their contribution to the discussion this evening.

I sincerely hope that these programs will have helped the American people to a better understanding of what our foreign policy is about and of how it is conducted. There is no greater danger confronting a democracy in the conduct of its foreign affairs than indifference on the part of the people to the great issues at stake and the resulting absence of clear thinking and constructive criticism. The first duty of responsible American citizenship is enlightened interest in public affairs, both domestic and foreign, and constant alertness to every manifestation of danger.

HARKNESS: Thank you once again, Secretary Hull, and thanks also to our other distinguished guests, Speaker Rayburn, Senators Connally and Vandenberg, and Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.

As all of you know, this is the last of this special limited series of programs arranged for broadcast by the NBC University of the Air to reveal to the American people something of the work, procedure, and policies of our Department of State. Judging by our mailbox, the series has been most successful. And to all of you Americans who listened each week with such keen interest, to the many who wrote us letters of praise and constructive criticism, I want to say for NBC and the State Department—thanks a million. It's a real pleasure to serve you. Now—this is Richard Harkness saying "Good night" from Washington.

